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Abstract
A large literature has documented statistically signicant e¤ects of monetary policy
on economic activity. The central explanation for how monetary policy transmits to
the real economy relies critically on nominal rigidities, which form the basis of the New
Keynesian (NK) framework. This paper studies a di¤erent transmission mechanism
that operates even in the absence of nominal rigidities. We show that in an OLG
setting, standard open market operations (OMO) carried by central banks have impor-
tant revaluation e¤ects that alter the level and distribution of wealth and the incentives
to work and save for retirement. Specically, expansionary OMO lead households to
front-load their purchases of durable goods and work and save more, thus generating a
temporary boom in durables, followed by a bust. The mechanism can account for the
empirical responses of key macroeconomic variables to monetary policy interventions.
Moreover, the model implies that di¤erent monetary interventions (e.g., OMO versus
helicopter drops) can have di¤erent qualitative e¤ects on activity. The mechanism can
thus complement the NK paradigm. We study an extension of the model incorporating
labor market frictions.
JEL Codes: E1, E52, E58, E32, E31.
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1 Introduction
A central question in monetary economics is how monetary policy interventions transmit
to the real economy. As emphasized by Woodford (2012) in his inuential Jackson Hole
symposium paper, in standard modern, general-equilibrium, frictionless asset pricing models,
open-market purchases of securities by central banks have no e¤ect on the real economy. This
result, which goes back to Wallace (1981)s seminal article, is at odds with the widely held
view that open-market operations (OMO) by central banks a¤ect interest rates and at odds
indeed with the very practice of central banks.
The irrelevance result is easiest to see in the context of a representative agent model, as
clearly explained by Woodford (2012);1 however, Wallace (1981)s widely cited result applies
to a more general setting with heterogeneous agents. A key premise for Wallaces irrelevance
result, however, is that OMO by the central bank are accompanied by scal transfers that
ensure no change in the income distribution following the policy intervention. In other words,
by construction, distributional e¤ects of OMO are muted by scal transfers that neutralize
distributional changes and hence preclude any change in individualss decisions following
the intervention.2
The goal of this paper is to study the e¤ects of monetary policy interventions when, real-
istically, OMO are not accompanied by neutralizing scal transfers nor is there a complete
set of state-contingent securities that would ensure an unchanged income distribution. The
motivation is necessarily a practical one. When researchers estimate the e¤ects of (exoge-
nous) monetary policy interventions, they do not (cannot) abstract from or control for the
1Suppose the central decides to sell a risky asset (an asset with lower return in a bad state); one would
think the private sector would be in principle only willing to buy it at a lower price. However, note that in
the settings analyzed by Woodford (2012), even if the central bank keeps the risky asset, the risk does not
disappear from the economy. The central banks earning on its portfolio are lower in the bad state and this
means lower earnings distributed to the Treasury (and hence higher taxes to be collected from the private
sector). So the representative agents after-tax income is equally dependent on the real-estate risk as before.
Thus asset prices are una¤ected by the open-market operation.
2Wallace (1981) refers to this condition as unchanged scal policy. An unchanged scal policy for him
is one in which there is no change in government consumption and no change in distribution. Note that
this means that to implement his OMO without the redistributional e¤ects, a Central Bank needs to ask
the government to manipulate transfers in a particular way to keep the income distribution unchanged. An
alternative way of obtaining this result would be to have a complete set of contingent securities that would
undo any change in the income distribution.
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distributional e¤ects they cause and there is no accompanying scal policy that undoes
them. Hence, to understand the e¤ects of those interventions on activity, researchers need to
take into account the potential impact of the redistribution caused by the policy intervention.
Indeed, Doepke and Schneider (2006)s empirical study points to a signicant revaluation of
assets and redistributional e¤ects from retired, old agent to younger generations following
monetary expansions. Relatedly, Coibion et al (2012) nd that monetary expansions reduce
inequality, as measured by Gini coe¢ cients, suggesting a redistribution away from wealthier
individuals.
Under these premises, we analyse the e¤ect of OMO on economic activity in a dynamic,
stochastic, general-equilibrium (DSG) model. In the model, overlapping generations (OLG)
of households use money, bonds, and durable goods to smooth consumption over their life
cycle as well as the business cycle. In the baseline model, we assume that all prices are
exible and there are no labour market frictions. (In extensions of the model, we study the
impact of labour frictions due to search and matching and wage rigidities.) The inclusion of
durable goods is motivated by the empirical nding that the response of economic activity is
primarily driven by the response of the durable-good sector (i.e., durable goods, residential
and business investment), whereas the response of non-durable consumption is weak at best.
The inclusion of government bonds is aimed at representing the standard OMO, entailing
sales and purchases of Treasury bonds, that is, changes in the composition of the central
banks balance sheet. Moreover, we realistically assume that the central bank transfers its
interest income to the Treasury. We also study expansions in the size of the balance sheet,
akin to helicopter drops, i.e. tax cuts nanced by an increase in the money supply, and
analyse di¤erences in the macroeconomic impact of these two policies.
We show that in such setting, a monetary expansion carried out through OMO triggers
a durable-driven boom in output, even under fully exible prices and wages.3 The operation
increases the central banks bonds holdings and consequently its interest revenues; the higher
revenues in turn lead to an increase in transfers to households via the Treasury.4 Moreover,
3In a representative-agent model with durables, this nominal exibility will immediately lead to money
neutrality.
4As in reality, the model assumes that the Central Banks interest revenues are remitted to the Treasure.
In addition, the model assumes that interest revenues received by the Treasury are fully rebated to agents.
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this leads to an increase in prices and a downward revaluation of nominal wealth. These
e¤ects alter the distribution of wealth across generations, beneting in particular future tax
payers. Because of this redistribution, currently young agents who su¤er from the negative
revaluation of their money holdings, decide to work and save more for retirement, causing a
decrease in the nominal and real interest rate. This drives up the demand for durable goods,
as durables become a more appealing way of saving (money and bonds su¤er the erosion
from the ination tax) and relatively more appealing than non-durables. (Retired old agents
who su¤er a bigger downward revaluation of their wealth cannot re-enter the labour market
and thus become the biggest losers from the intervention.) In the baseline model the output
increase is driven by the labour-supply response. In the extension with search and matching
frictions in the labour market, the increase in output is instead driven by an increase in
rmslabour demand.
To understand the importance of agentslife cycle savings considerations, we also study
a limit case of our baseline model with an innitely-lived representative agent. In this limit
case, monetary neutrality is obtained, as in Sidrauski (1967). This is because agents su¤ering
a revaluation e¤ect on their nancial assets are compensated in equal amounts by current
and future transfers from a scal authority rebating lump-sum transfers, thus precluding
wealth e¤ects and any change in behaviour. In the absence of nominal rigidities, real wages
and relative prices are thus entirely determined by real factors. Nominal wage income and
durable good prices therefore increase in tandem in the presence of ination, and the increase
in nominal wage income exactly o¤sets the desire to bring forward durable good purchases.
This is true even though ination does reduce the real value of nancial wealth.5 Money
neutrality in our model obtains under the same conditions in which Ricardian Equivalence
holds (Barro 1974). By (realistically) precluding risk sharing of aggregate monetary policy
shocks across generations, the model yields money non-neutrality even with exible prices.6
5Recall the assumption that the government makes lump-sum transfers from seignioriage revenuesto to
agents. Following Weil (1991)s arguments, based on an endowment economy with helicopter drops, we show
that also in an economy with production and durable goods, the reduction in wealth caused by OMO, is
exactly o¤set by future increases in government transfers, which renders money neutral.
6Allowing for scal transfers to exactly o¤set the heterogenous e¤ects of monetary policy across di¤erent
agents would restore the money neutrality in our model. Realistically, however, monetary policy shocks are
not accompanied by targeted scal transfers aimed at undoing the monetary e¤ects. Hence, to interpret
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In sharp contrast, expansionary helicopter drops in the baseline model that generate a
comparable fall in the nominal interest rate as in the OMO, cause a bust in durables and
a fall in output and hours, though the e¤ects are quantitatively small. In other words, two
interventions causing a similar fall in nominal interest rates lead to markedly di¤erent e¤ects
in economic activity.7
Our model thus o¤er a setting consistent with both i) the way in which Central Banks
and in particular the Fed a¤ects its policy rate, i.e., mostly through OMO and ii) empirical
estimates on how such changes a¤ects the macroeconomy and more specically, the durable
good sector. As a by-product, our results speak to a criticism red by Barsky, House and
Kimball (2003, 2007) against the standard New Keynesian (NK) representative-agent model.
The authors ague that the standard NK model generate counterfactual responses of durable
and non-durable consumption to monetary policy interventions and, moreover, under rea-
sonable parametrizations, counterfactual responses for aggregate output. Specically, when
durable goodsprices are relatively exible, as appears to be the case in the data, these
models predict that following a monetary expansion, non-durable purchases increase, while
durable purchases, remarkably, decrease. And, indeed, in the case of fully exible durable
prices, the predicted contraction in the durable goods producing sector is so large that the
monetary expansion has almost no e¤ect on total aggregate output.8 ;9 By introducing retire-
the data and in particular the empirical evidence on the e¤ect of monetary policy interventions, one cannot
assume away the redistributional e¤ets of monetary policy.
7The di¤erence is driven by the distributional e¤ects of the two policies. Since we assume a (delayed)
balanced budget, a monetary expansion generated by a one-o¤ helicopter drop leads to transfers that are
immediately rebated to working agents. So, the loss generated by the revaluation e¤ect on the working agents
is more than compensated by the transfers, thus generating a positive wealth e¤ect and a fall in labour and
output. For the old, instead, the revaluation e¤ect, as in the OMO case, leads to a negative wealth e¤ect.
8The literature typically focuses on completely exible durable prices, for which the comovement problem
is most severe. Bils and Klenow (2004) report a median price duration of only two months for new cars.
Barsky et al. (2007) argue that prices of new homes are highly exible. A key result in Barsky et al. (2007)
is that the rigidity of durable good prices plays a crucial role: if these prices are exible, monetary policy is
nearly neutral, irrespectively of the rigidity of non-durable good prices.
9These predictions are in sharp contrast with conventional wisdom and the empirical evidence for the
U.S. economy. As we discuss in the next Section, the response of GDP to monetary policy changes is
driven almost entirely by the response of durable goods consumption and residential investment. These two
items are the most sensitive components of GDP, increasing fast and sharply in response to a monetary
expansion. In contrast, non durable goods and services consumption show virtually no response to monetary
policy interventions. We shall go back to this in the empirical section, where we carefully document these
responses. See for example Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Barsky et al.(2003),
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mentour model provides a mechanism that counteracts the channel highlighted by Barsky
et al (2007) and can thus help the NK model in mimicking the response of the economy. As
such, our model can complement standard NK by adding a realistic feature and restoring its
ability to match the data.
In the Appendix we further extend the model to allow for search and matching frictions
in the labour market and real wage rigidities. In this version of the model, the increase
in employment due to the monetary expansion is caused by an increase in the demand
for workers, rather than by the increased labour supply, as in our baseline model. The
introduction of these frictions together with other frictions we abstract from can help
ne-tune the model to better match the data. For expositional clarity and to focus on the
value-added, however, we keep the baseline model relatively simple.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the main empirical facts that mo-
tivate our model. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 performs various numerical
exercises. and discusses the ndings in light of the empirical evidence. Section 5 o¤ers
concluding remarks.
2 Empirical Evidence
This Section rst revisits the aggregate e¤ects of monetary policy on the macroeconomy,
highlighting the role of durables. It then reviews the evidence on redistributional e¤ects.
2.1 Monetary expansions and the response of durables
Policy and academic discussions on the economic e¤ects of monetary policy interventions
often rely on the relatively high sensitivity of the durables sector to interest rate changes.
We corroborate this premise by studying the U.S. evidence from 1966 until 2007 using a
standard recursive VAR approach. In the Supplemental Appendix we study the data using
Romer and Romer (2004)s approach to identify exogenous monetary policy interventions.
The two methods show that monetary expansions lead to temporary booms in durables,
with little or no response of non-durables. This motivates the introduction of durables in
our model, as the key variable driving the response of output. We discuss the data and
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estimation next.
The empirical analysis for measuring the e¤ect of monetary policy shocks relies on a
general linear dynamic model of the macroeconomy whose structure is given by the following
system of equations (see for example, Olivei and Tenreyro, 2007):
Yt =
SX
s=0
BYt s +
SX
s=1
Cpt s +Ayv
y
t (1)
pt =
SX
s=0
DsYt s +
SX
s=1
gs pt s + v
p
t : (2)
Boldface letters are used to indicate vectors or matrices of variables or coe¢ cients. In par-
ticular, Yt is a vector of non-policy macroeconomic variables (e.g., output, durable and
non-durable consumption, aggregate and relative sectoral prices), and pt is the scalar vari-
able that summarizes the policy stance. We take the federal funds rate as our measure of
policy, and use innovations in the federal funds rate as a measure of monetary policy shocks.
Federal Reserve operating procedures have varied in the past 40 years, but several authors
have argued that funds-rate targeting provides a good description of Federal Reserve policy
over most of the period (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1992, and Bernanke and Mihov, 1998).
Equation (1) allows the non-policy variables Yt to depend on both current and lagged val-
ues of Y, on lagged values of p, and on a vector of uncorrelated disturbances vy. Equation
(2) states that the policy variable pt depends on both current and lagged values of Y, on
lagged values of p, and on the monetary policy shock vp.10 As such, the system embeds the
key restriction for identifying the dynamic e¤ects of exogenous policy shocks on the various
macro variables Y: policy shocks do not a¤ect macro variables within the current period.
Although debatable, this identifying assumption is standard in VAR analyses.11
Given the identifying assumption that policy shocks do not a¤ect macro variables within
10Policy shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated with the elements of vy. Independence from contempora-
neous economic conditions is considered part of the denition of an exogenous policy shock. The standard
interpretation of vp is a combination of various random factors that might a¤ect policy decisions, including
data errors and revisions, preferences of participants at the FOMC meetings, politics, etc. (See Bernanke
and Mihov 1998).
11See, among others, Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Christiano et al. (1999)
and (2005), Jean Boivin and Marc Giannoni (2006), and Julio Rotemberg and Michael Woodford (1997).
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the current period, we can rewrite the system in a standard VAR reduced-form, with only
lagged variables on the right-hand side. The system can then be estimated equation-by-
equation using ordinary least squares. The e¤ect of policy innovations on the non-policy
variables is identied with the impulse-response function of Y to past changes in vp, with
the federal funds rate placed last in the ordering.12 An estimated series for the policy shock
can be obtained via a Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix of the reduced-form
residuals.
In the benchmark estimation, we use seasonally adjusted data from 1966:Q1 to 2007:Q4.
The beginning of the estimation period is dictated by the behavior of monetary policy.
After 1965 the federal funds rate started to exceed the discount rate, becoming the primary
instrument of monetary policy. We stop in 2007:Q4 to avoid concerns with the potentially
confounding e¤ects from the nancial crisis and the zero-lower bound.
The non-policy variables in the system include real GDP, the GDP deator, durable-
sector consumption (including residential investment), non-durable consumption (including
both non durable goods and services consumption), the relative price deator of non-durables
vis-a-vis durables, and an index of spot commodity prices.13 As is now standard in the
literature, the inclusion of the commodity price index in the system is aimed at mitigating
the price puzzle, whereby a monetary tightening initially coincides with an increasing
rather than decreasing price level.
We estimate each equation in the reduced-form VAR separately by OLS. In our bench-
mark specication, all the variables in the vector Y are expressed in log levels. The policy
variable, the federal funds rate, is expressed in levels. We formalize trends in the non-policy
variables as deterministic, and allow for a linear trend in each of the equations of the VAR.
<<Figure 1 here>>
12The ordering of the variables in Yt is irrelevant. Since identication of the dynamic e¤ects of exogenous
policy shocks on the macro variables Y only requires that policy shocks do not a¤ect the given macro
variables within the current period, it is not necessary to identify the entire structure of the model.
13The source for all aggregates and their deators is the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Quarterly National
Income and Product Accounts. The sectoral deators are chain-weighted indexes of the real deators for
the individual sub-categories, with the weight being the nominal shares of the sub-category on the sectors
consumption. The source for the spot commodity price index is the Commodity Research Bureau.
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The estimated impulse-responses are depicted in Figure 1, together with 95 percent con-
dence bands around the estimated responses. We consider a monetary policy shock that
corresponds to a 75-basis point decline in the funds rate on impact. For ease of compari-
son, the response of the three economic aggregates (GDP, durables and non-durables) to the
shock are graphed on the same scale across plots. The top right panel shows that the GDP
response to the policy shock is persistent, peaking around 7 quarters after the shock and
slowly decaying thereafter. The top left plot shows the response of durables, which, as it is
apparent, is both fast and sizable. Durables fall on impact, reaching a level close to its max-
imum response 3 quarters after the shock. Moreover, the peak response for durables is more
than three times as large as the GDP response. In contrast, the response of non-durables,
depicted in the center left panel, is virtually insignicant, with its peak response being less
than a fourth of that for durables. The center right panel shows that, despite controlling
for commodity prices, there is still a price puzzle,although the increase in prices is not
statistically signicant. It takes about 7 quarters after the shock for prices to start falling.
The bottom left panel shows that the relative price of durables over nondurables tends to
increase following the monetary shock, thought the increase is not statistically signicant.
The response of the fed funds rate, shown in the bottom right panel, converges back to 0
around the 7th quarter after the shock.
The di¤erences in the responses of durables and non durables are substantial from an
economic standpoint. The policy shock leads to a fall in durables in the following 8 quarters
by almost 135 basis points. In contrast, the fall in nondurables is less than 10 basis points.
As said, Appendix we carry out an alternative exercise based on Romer and Romers
narrative approach. The monetary policy shocks "t are quarterly averages of the monetary
policy shocks identied by Romer and Romer (2004), extended through 2008 by Coibion
et al (2012). Reassuringly, the results, illustrated in the Appendix, are qualitatively sim-
ilar (and quantitatively close) to those obtained using the VAR approach. The Appendix
also investigates the response of taxes following a monetary intervention, a response that
becomes interesting in light of the model. With a monetary expansion, bond holdings held
by the Central Bank increases and so do its interest revenues. This leads to an increase in
remittances from the Central Bank to the Treasury and thus to higher transfers (or lower
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taxes) to individuals.
2.2 Redistributional E¤ects of Monetary Policy
A main goal of our paper is to study the redistributional e¤ects of monetary policy and their
impact on aggregate variables in a quantitative model. Two empirical papers substantiate
our motivation. The rst paper is Doepke and Schneider (2006), which documents signi-
cant wealth redistribution in the US economy following (unexpected) inationary episodes.
The authors nd that the main losers from a monetary expansion are rich, old households
holding nominal bonds (as in our model). Their analysis is based on detailed data on assets
and liabilities held by di¤erent segments of the population, from which they calculate the
revaluation e¤ects caused by ination.
Our model will embed these redistributional revaluation e¤ects and will bring two ad-
ditional considerations to the analysis. The rst consideration is how these redistributional
e¤ects alter the various demographic groupsincentives to work, consume, and save in di¤er-
ent types of assets and how these changes a¤ect the macroeconomy. The second consideration
is how the Treasury redistributes the higher revenues stemming from the monetary policy
intervention. These higher revenues consist of i) higher value of remittances received from
the Central Bank as a result of the interest on bonds earned by the central bank; and ii)
gains from the revaluation of government debt assuming the government is a net debtor.
The revaluation gains by the government can be large, as Doepke and Schneider (2006)s cal-
culations illustrate. The remittances are also considerable, amounting to an average of two
percent of total government revenues during our period of analysis, with signicant volatility.
In the baseline model, we assume that these remittances are rebated to the young (working
agents), as in practice the taxation burden tends to fall on the working population. However,
the framework can be easily adjusted to allow for di¤erent tax-tranfer congurations.
A second empirical paper motivating our analysis is Coibion et al. (2012), who nd that
unexpected monetary contractions as well as permanent decreases in the ination target lead
to an increase in inequality in earnings, expenditures, and consumption. Their results rely
on the CEX survey, and thus exclude top income earners. The authors however argue that
their estimates provide lower bounds for the increase in inequality following monetary policy
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contractions. This is because individuals in the top one-percent of the income distribution
receive a third of their income from nancial assets a much larger share than any other
segment of the population; hence, the income of the top one-percent likely rises even more
than for most other households following a monetary contraction.
Consistent with these ndings, in our model, monetary policy contractions cause a re-
distribution of income to old agents, who rely more heavily on wealth, from young agents
and future tax payers. The consumption of goods by the old agents also increases relative
to that of young agents, consistent with Coibion et al. (2012)s ndings.
3 Open market operations in a model without nominal
rigidities
We study the dynamic e¤ects of monetary policy shocks in a general equilibrium model which
embeds overlapping generations and a parsimonious life cycle structure with two stages:
working life and retirement. Transitions from working life to retirement and from retirement
to death are stochastic but obey xed probabilities, following Gertler (1999). Financial
markets are incomplete in the sense that there exists no insurance against risks associated
with retirement and longevity. As a result, agents accumulate savings during their working
lives, which they gradually deplete once retired. These savings can take the form of money,
bonds and durable consumption goods.
The money supply is controlled by a central bank, who implements monetary policy
using open market operations, that is, by selling or buying bonds. Realistically, we assume
that the central bank transfers its prots to the treasury. The treasury in turn balances
its budget by setting lump-sum transfers to households. In this environment we study the
dynamic e¤ects of persistent monetary policy shocks. We contrast our benchmark model
with an alternative economy in which the central bank uses helicopter drops of money
rather than open market operations to implement monetary policy.
We solve the model using a standard numerical method.14 This may seem challenging
14Specically, we use rst-order perturbation, exploiting its certainty-equivalence property. See the ap-
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given the presence of heterogeneous households and incomplete markets. In particular, the
presence of aggregate uctuations implies that a time-varying wealth distribution is part of
the state of the macroeconomy. To render the model tractable, we introduce a government
transfer towards newborn agents which eliminates inequality among young agents.15 We
show that aggregation then becomes straightforward and only the distribution of wealth
between the group of young and old agents is relevant for aggregate outcomes. At the same
time, our setup preserves the most basic life-cycle savings pattern: young agents save for old
age and retired agents gradually consume their wealth.
Another advantage of our model with limited heterogeneity is that it nests a model with
an innitely-lived representative agent. One can show analytically that monetary policy
shocks do not a¤ect real activity under the representative agent assumption, provided that
money and consumption enter the utility function separably.16 This result is closely related
to the fact that by construction redistributional e¤ects are absent in an economy without
heterogeneity. Also, the operating procedures of monetary policy (OMO versus helicopter
drop) have the same e¤ect on prices, a result that is broken down once we move beyond the
representative agent assumption.
In the benchmark model discussed in this section we do not incorporate any form of
product or labor market friction. Hence, the monetary transmission in the model is very
di¤erent to the transmission in New Keynesian models, which typically abstract from demo-
graphics and household heterogeneity in wealth. In the Appendix we analyze the combined
transmission of monetary policy shocks by introducing labor market frictions to the model.
pendix for details.
15Wealth inequality among retired agents is preserved in our framework.
16This result by itself is unsuprising, as (super)neutrality results for representative agent models with pro-
ductive durables, have been known since the seminal work of Sidrauski (1967) and Fischer (1979). Sidrauski
(1967) shows that when money enters the utility function separably, the rate of ination does not a¤ect real
outcomes in the steady state. Fischer (1979) shows that under logarithmic utility this is also true along
transition paths. Under alternative utility functions this is generally not true, but in quantitative exercises
deviations from neutrality are often found to be quantitatively small, see for example Danthine, Donaldson
and Smith (1987). In our benchmark model we will assume logarithmic utility and thus focus on a di¤erent
source of non-neutrality.
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3.1 Model
3.1.1 Agents and demographics
We model a closed economy which consists of a continuum of households, a continuum of
perfectly competitive rms and a government, which is comprised of a treasury and a central
bank. In every period a measure of new young agents is born. Young agents retire and turn
into old agents with a time-invariant probability o 2 [0; 1) in each period. Upon retirement,
agents face a time invariant death probability x 2 (0; 1] in each period, including the initial
period of retirement. The population size and distribution over the age groups remains
constant over time and the total population size is normalized to one. The fraction of young
agents in the economy, denoted , can be solved for by exploiting the implication that the
number of agents retiring equals the number of deaths in the population, i.e.
o = x (1   + o) : (3)
The age status of an agent is denoted by a superscript s 2fn;y;og, with n denoting a
newborn young agent, y a pre-existing young agent, and o an old agent.
Households derive utility from non-durables, denoted c 2 R+, a stock of durables, d 2 R+;
and real money balances, denoted m 2 R+. They can also invest in nominal bonds, the real
value of which we label b 2 R. Bonds pay a net nominal interest rate r 2 R+.
Young agents, including the newborns, supply labor to rms on a competitive labor
market whereas old agents are not productive. Durables depreciate at a rate  2 (0; 1) per
period and are produced using the same technology as non-durables. Because of the latter,
durables and non-durables have the same market price. All agents take laws of motion of
prices, interest rates, government transfers and idiosyncratic life-cycle shocks as given. We
describe the decision problems of the agents in turn.
3.1.2 Old agents
Agents maximize expected lifetime utility subject to their budgets, taking the law of motion
of the aggregate state, denoted by  , as given. Letting primes denote next periods variables,
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we can express the decision problem for old agents (s = o) recursively and in real terms as:
V o(a; ) = max
c;d;m;b
U(c; d;m) +  (1  x)EV o(a0; 0)
s:t: (4)
c+ d+m+ b = a+ o
a0  (1  ) d+ m
1 + 0
+
(1 + r) b
1 + 0
;
c; d;m  0;
where V o(a; ) is the value function of an old agent which depends on the aggregate state
and the real value of wealth, denoted by a, E is the expectation operator conditional on
information available in the current period,  2 (0; 1) is the agents subjective discount
factor, and  2 R is the net rate of ination. U(c; d;m) is a utility function and we assume
that Uj(c; d;m) > 0; Ujj(c; d;m) < 0 and limj!0 Uj(c; d;m) = 1 for j = c; d;m. Finally,
 s 2 R is a transfer from the government to an agent with age status s, so o is the transfer
to any old agent.
The budget constraint implies that old agents have no source of income other than from
wealth accumulated previously. Implicit in the recursive formulation of the agents decision
problem is a transversality condition lim
t!1
Ett (1  x)t Uc;txt = 0; where x = d;m; b and
where Uc;t denotes the marginal utility of non-durable consumption. Finally, we assume that
agents derive no utility from bequests and that the wealth of the deceased agents is equally
distributed among the currently young agents.
3.1.3 Young agents
Young agents supply labor in exchange for a real wage w 2 R+ per hour worked. The
optimization problem for newborn agents (s = n) and pre-existing young agents (s = y) can
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be written as:
V s(a; ) = max
c;d;m;b;h
U(c; d;m)   h
1+
1 + 
+  (1  o)EV y(a0; 0) + o (1  x)EV o(a0; 0)
s = n;y (5)
s:t:
c+ d+m+ b = a+ wh+  bq +  s;
a0  (1  ) d+ m
1 + 0
+
(1 + r) b
1 + 0
;
c; d;m  0;
where young agents too obey transversality conditions. The term  h
1+
1+
captures the disutility
obtained from hours worked, denoted h, with  > 0 being a scalings parameter and  > 0
being the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Bequests from deceased agents are denoted  bq.
Moreover,  s is a again lump-sum transfer from the government. When making their optimal
decisions, young agents take into account that in the next period they may be retired, which
occurs with probability o (1  x) ; or be deceased which happens with probability ox:We
thus assume that upon retirement, young agents may be immediately hit by a death shock.
3.1.4 Firms
Goods are produced by a continuum of perfectly competitive and identical goods rms.
These rms operate on a linear production function:
yt = ht: (6)
Prot maximization implies that wt = 1; that is, the real wage equals one.
3.1.5 Central bank
Although we do not model any frictions within the government, we make a conceptual
distinction between a central bank conducting monetary policy and a treasury conducting
scal policy. We make this distinction for clarity and in order to relate the model to real-
world practice.
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The central bank controls the nominal money supply, Mt 2 R+, by conducting open
market operations. In particular, the central bank can sell or buy government bonds. We
denote the nominal value of the bonds held by the central bank by Bcbt 2 R. The use of
these open market operations implies that in every given period the change in bonds held
by the central bank equals the change in money in circulation, i.e.
Bcbt  Bcbt 1 = Mt  Mt 1: (7)
By implication, the size of the central banks balance sheet, i.e. the total amount of
its assets/liabilities, is kept constant over time. Correspondingly, the central bank transfers
its accounting prot -typically called seigniorage- to the treasury.17 The real value of the
seigniorage transfer, labeled  cbt 2 R, is given by:
 cbt =
rt 1bcbt 1
1 + t
: (8)
The above description is in line with how central banks conduct monetary policy, as well as
with the typical arrangement between a central bank and the treasury. By contrast, many
models of monetary policy assume monetary policy is implemented using "helicopter drops",
i.e. expansions of the money supply that are not accompanied by a purchase of assets but
instead by a scal transfer that is equal to change in the money supply. Modern monetary
models are often silent on how monetary policy is implemented and directly specify an
interest rate rule. In our framework, it is important to be careful about modeling the precise
implementation of monetary policy since the associated monetary-scal arrangements pin
down redistributional e¤ects and hence the impact of changes in monetary policy on the real
economy.
When we implement the model quantitatively, we simulate exogenous shocks to monetary
policy, that is, unexpected open market operations. We do so by specifying a stochastic
process that a¤ects the growth rate of the money supply Mt.
17We abstract from operational costs incurred by the central bank.
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3.1.6 Treasury
The treasury conducts scal policy. For simplicity, we abstract from government purchases of
goods and assume that the treasury follows balanced budget policy, with the exception that
we allow for some delay in transferring income to households.18 The government has an initial
level of bonds Bgt 1 which gives rise to interest income (or expenditure if the government has
debt) on top of the seigniorage transfer from the central bank. To balance its budget, the
government makes lump-sum transfers to the households, which can be either positive or
negative. Letting j  0 denote the transfer delay, the governments budget constraint can
be written as:
rt j 1b
g
t j 1
1 + t j
+  cbt j = o
n
t +  (1  o) yt + (1  ) ot (9)
Here, o
n
t is the total transfer to the newborns,  (1  o) yt is the transfer to pre-existing
young agents and bgt is the real value of government bonds.
For tractability we also assume that the government provides newborn agents with an
initial transfer that equalizes the wealth levels with the average after-tax wealth among
pre-existing agents, i.e.
nt = a
y
t + 
y
t ; (10)
where ayt 
R
i:s=y
ai;tdi is the average wealth among pre-existing young agents. Since before-
tax wealth is the only source of heterogeneity among young agents, all young agents make
the same decisions and what arises is a representative young agent. This implication makes
the model tractable. Note that although we eliminate heterogeneity among young agents
by assumption, we do preserve heterogeneity between young and old agents, as well as
heterogeneity among old agents.
Finally, we assume that only productive agents are a¤ected by transfers/taxes, i.e. we
set ot = 0. This assumption is motivated by the reality that the majority of the tax burden
falls on people in their working life, since due to the progressivity of tax systems.19
18The assumption that the government changes tax policy within the same quarter in response to shocks
seems somewhat extreme and hence we allow for a delay.
19We have solved a version of our model in which instead taxes are proportional to wealth levels, and
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3.1.7 Market clearing and equilibrium
Aggregate non-durables and durables are given by:
ct = c
y
t + (1  ) cot (11)
dt = d
y
t + (1  ) dot ; (12)
where superscripts y and o denote the averages among young and old agents, dened anal-
ogously to the denition of ayt .
20 Clearing in the markets for goods, money and bonds
requires:
ct + dt = h
y
t + (1  ) dt 1; (13)
mt = m
y
t + (1  )mot ; (14)
0 = bgt + b
cb
t + b
y
t + (1  ) bot (15)
Finally, the size of the bequest received per young agent is given by:
 bqt =
xa
o
t + oxa
y
t

(16)
We are now ready dene a recursive competitive equilibrium:
Denition. A recursive competitive equilibrium is dened by policy rules for
non-durable consumption, cs(a; ); durable consumption, ds(a; ); money hold-
ings, ms(a; ), bond holdings, bs(a; ); labor supply, hs(a; ), with s = n;y;o; cb;g,
as well as laws of motion for ination, the nominal interest rate and the real wage,
such that households optimize their expected life-time utility subject to their con-
straints and the law of motion for the aggregate state, the treasury and central
banks follow their specied policies, and the markets for bonds, money, goods and
labor clear in every period. The aggregate state   includes the value of the mon-
etary policy shock, the distribution of wealth among agents, as well as the initial
obtained results similar to the ones obtained from our benchmark model.
20Due to the transfer to newborns cyt = c
n
t , d
y
t = d
n
t ; b
y
t = b
n
t and m
y
t = m
n
t .
18
holdings of assets by households, the treasury and the central bank.
3.1.8 Three analytical results in a representative agent version
A special case of our model is obtained when we set the death probability to one, i.e.
x = 1. In this case, agents immediately die upon retirement and old agents are e¤ectively
removed from the model. Given the absence of heterogeneity among young agents, the model
becomes observationally equivalent to one with an innitely-lived representative household
with subjective discount factor e =  (1  o) : This special case is useful to understand the
role of household heterogeneity in the transmission of monetary policy, as several analytical
results can be derived which contrast our numerical results to be presented in the next
section. The rst result is:
Result 1. Monetary policy is neutral with respect to real activity in the representative agent
model.
The arguments for the monetary neutrality follow Sidrauski (1967). The representative
agentsrst-order conditions for durables in and labor supply, and the aggregate resource
constraint are, respectively:
Uc;t = Ud;t + e (1  )EtUc;t+1 (17)
Uc;t = h

t (18)
ct + dt = ht + (1  ) dt 1 (19)
for t = 0; 1; :::Given an initial level of durables and that the utility function is separable in
its arguments, these three equations pin down the equilibrium solution paths for ct, dt and
ht in any period t without any reference to variables related to monetary policy. Given this
solution it straightforward to pin down output and the real interest rate as well.
Next, we consider how an unexpected monetary policy shock impacts on the price level
in the representative agent world. We can derive the following result:
Result 2. Monetary policy shocks impact on the prices solely through their e¤ect on gov-
ernment transfers to representative agent.
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This result can be seen from the governments consolidated present value budget constraint,
which is derived in the appendix. In expectations it can be written as:
Et
1P
s=t
Dk

rs
1 + rs
ms   gs

=
mt 1   (1 + rt 1)
 
bgt 1 + b
cb
t 1

1 + t
(20)
or, where Ds 
s 1Q
k=t
1+k+1
1+rk
is the agents valuation of one unit of nominal wealth received
in period s > t, and Dt  1; and gt  ont +  (1  o) yt is the total transfer to the
households. The left-hand side represents the expected present value of the opportunity
costs of holding money paid by the household, rs
1+rs
ms, which are income to the government,
minus the transfers to the households, gs . On the right hand side are the initial liabilities
of the government. The appendix also demonstrates that from the neutrality of Result 1 it
follows that Ds and rs1+rsms; with s  1, are una¤ected by changes in monetary policy. Given
that t is the only variable on the right-hand side that is not predetermined, it follows that
its initial response to a monetary policy shock is fully pinned down by the change in the
expected present value of the transfer. Thus, the impact of monetary policy shock on the
price level depends crucially on how seigniorage transfers to the households via the treasury
respond.
Intuition for Result 1, the irrelevance of monetary policy for real outcomes in the represen-
tative agent model, is obtained by considering the net wealth e¤ects of changes in monetary
policy, following Weil (1991). From the same equation we can infer our third result:
Result 3. Changes in monetary policy do not create net wealth e¤ects in the representative
agent model.
The ip-side of the governments budget constraint is the consolidated budget constraint
of the households, excluding labor income. In particular, the initial liability of the govern-
ment are equal to the value of bonds and money held by the public. The present value
constraint shows that any such revaluation is exactly o¤set by a decline in the expected
present value of transfers. Thus, a negative revaluation of the representative agents nomi-
nal wealth following a surprise monetary expansion is exactly o¤set by a decline in transfers
to be obtained from the government. Hence, there is no net wealth e¤ect, an insight that is
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closely related to the seminal work of Barro (1978) and that was spelled out by Weil (1991)
in the context of monetary model.
3.1.9 The transmission of OMOs with heterogeneous agents
The results derived for the special representative agent case help to understand the real
e¤ects of open market operations in the full model with heterogeneous agents. In this full
version, agents are a¤ected di¤erently by monetary policy shocks for two reasons. The is
that portfolio size and compositions are heterogeneous across agents, a¤ecting the extent
to which they are a¤ected by a surprise revaluation of nominal wealth. Second, agents
are a¤ected di¤erently by a change in the path of transfers depending on their individual
age status. Old agents can be expected to be disadvantaged by an expansionary monetary
policy shock, since they su¤er the negative revaluation of wealth but do not benet from an
increase in transfers. The same holds for a young agent who retires soon after a persistent
and expansionary monetary shock. A monetary expansion also impacts directly on yet
unborn generations, as the change in policy a¤ects the transfers they will receive from the
government.
The redistributional e¤ects impact on agentssavings decisions. We can make this ef-
fect explicit by analyzing the young agentsrst-order conditions for durables and bonds,
respectively:
Uyc;t = U
y
d;t +  (1  o)Et
Uyc;t+1
1 + t+1
+  (1  x)Et
Uyoc;t+1
1 + t+1
; (21)
Uyc;t =  (1  o)Et
(1 + rt)U
y
c;t+1
1 + t+1
+  (1  x)Et
(1 + rt)U
yo
c;t+1
1 + t+1
; (22)
where superscript yo denotes a newly retired agent. Agents who retire face a reduction in
their expected lifetime income and hence it holds in the stationary equilibrium that Uy <
Uyo, i.e. the marginal utility of wealth is higher when young than once newly retired. The
redistributional e¤ect brought about by an expansionary monetary shock further exacerbates
the increase in the marginal utility of wealth upon retirement, i.e. Uyo increases further
relative to Uy. Young agents thus become more strongly incentivised to save for retirement
during a monetary expansion. The above two rst-order conditions make clear that this
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additional desire to save pushes down the interest rate the real interest rate and encourages
young agents to accumulate more durables. In our numerical simulations these e¤ects result
in an increase in aggregate durable expenditures in the equilibrium, pushing up aggregate
output.
4 Quantitative simulations
In this section we analyze the e¤ects of open market operations in our model using numerical
simulations. Before doing so we specify the details of household preferences and the monetary
policy rule. We assume that the utility function is a CES basket of non-durables, durables
and money, nested in a CRRA function:
U(ci;t; di;t;mi;t) =
x1 i;t   1
1   ;
xi;t 
h
c
 1

i;t + d
 1

i;t + m
 1

i;t
i 
 1
; (23)
where ; ; ;  > 0. Here,  is the elasticity of substitution between non-durables, durables
and money,  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, and  and  are parameters giving
utility weights to durables and money, respectively. Computation of the dynamic equilib-
rium path seems complicated due to the high dimensionality of the aggregate state  t. In
the Appendix we show that the solving the model using a standard rst-order perturbation
(linearization) method is nonetheless straightforward under the above preference specica-
tion.21
The central bank is assumed to set the money supply according to the following process:
Mt
Mt 1
= 1 + zt (24)
where zt is an exogenous shock process to the rate of nominal money growth, assumed to be
21In particular, we exploit the properties of rst-order perturbation and show that the implied certainty
equivalence with respect to the aggregate state allows us to express the decision rules of the old agents as
linear functions of their wealth levels. This in turn implies that aggregation is straightforward and that only
the distribution of wealth between between old agents and young agents is relevant for aggregate outcomes.
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of the following form:
zt =  (m mt 1) + "t;  2 [0; 1] ; (25)
where "t is an i.i.d. shock innovation and m is the steady-state value of real money balances.
A positive shock increases the money supply. When  < 1 this increase is gradually reversed
in subsequent periods due to the above feedback rule.22
4.1 Parameter values
Parameter values are chosen corresponding to a model period of one quarter. The subjective
discount factor, , is set to 0:9732 which implies an annual real interest rate of 4 percent
in the deterministic steady state. The steady state real interest rate is lower than the sub-
jective discount rate, 1=   1, due to the retirement savings motive arising in the presence
of incomplete insurance markets. The durable preference parameter  is chosen to target a
steady-state spending ratio of 20 percent on durables. To set the money preference parame-
ter, we target a quarterly money velocity, dened as y
m
, of 1:8. The intratemporal elasticity
of substitution between non-durables, durables and money, , is set equal to one, as is the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, . These two parameter settings imply that money and
consumption enter the utility function additively in logs. Hence, our benchmark results are
not driven by non-separability of money and consumption in the utility function. We set the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply  equal to one following many macro studies. The parameter
scaling the disutility of labor, ; such as to normalize aggregate quarterly output to one.
Life-cycle transition parameters are set to imply a life expectancy of 60 years, with on
expectation 40 years in working life and 20 in retirement. Accordingly, we set o = 0:0063
and x = 0:0125 which imply  = 0:6677: The depreciation rate of durables, , is set to 0:04
following Baxter (1996). The initial level of government debt is set to sixty percent of annual
output. For simplicity we assume the central bank starts o¤ without any bond holdings or
debt. The shock process parameter  is set tot 0:2 which implies that the half life of the
response for the nominal interest rate is about 2:5 years. Finally, we set the governments
22In equilibrium, both real an nominal money balances increase following the shock. Also, the rule implies
that the net rate of ination is zero in the steady state.
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delay in transferring income to households to one year, i.e. j = 4. Parameter values are
presented in Table 1.
<<Table 1 here>>
4.2 The dynamic e¤ects of open market operations
Figure 2 presents the responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock, implemented
using open market operations. The magnitude of the shock is scaled to imply a reduction
in the nominal interest rate of about 75 basis points. The shock increases the price level as
well as aggregate output on impact. The responses of durables and non-durables make clear
that this increase in output is entirely driven by an increase in expenditures on durables.
Non-durables decline on impact, although the magnitude of the response is much smaller
than the response of durables. Finally, the shock leads to a moderate decline in the real
interest rate.
<<Figure 2 here>>
In the periods after the initial shock, the nominal interest rate and the price level grad-
ually revert back to their initial levels and the same holds for non-durable purchases. This
happens as a result of the reversion in the monetary policy rule. The booms in durables and
output are also gradually reversed but the responses overshoot and turn into a busts several
quarters after the shock, in line with the empirical impulse responses. The overshooting in
durable purchases and output is related to the large degree of endogenous persistence in the
model, which is also reected in the response of the real interest rate which continues to
decline in the year following the shock and remains low quite persistently.
Figure 3 plots several variables that provide insight into the impact of monetary policy
shocks as well as their endogenous propagation over time. The top left panel plots the
response of real money balances which increase on impact and then gradually revert back
to the steady state, akin to the responses of the nominal interest rate and the price level.
From the positive response of the price level it follows that nominal money balances increase
as well. The top right panel plots the transfer to the young households, which increases by
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about 0:6 percent of output one year following the shock and gradually revert back in the
years after.
<<Figure 3 here>>
The bottom four panels shows the aggregated responses of non-durable consumption
and (the stock of) durable consumption for the young and the old agents. Following the
shock, the old agents reduce both types of consumption. Underlying, old households face a
reduction in their real wealth due to the increase in prices, but are not compensated by an
increase in transfers. The young, by contrast, increase durable consumption. This response
can be understood by noting that a young agent benets from the increase in transfers, but
only up to the period in which she retires. This implies a steepening of the decline in the
agents income prole over the life cycle which increases the desire to save for retirement. In
equilibrium, aggregate bond holdings are zero and the supply of money is determined largely
by monetary factors and therefore cannot easily accommodate an increased aggregate desire
to save. Bringing forward durable purchases, however, is an alternative way of saving that
not much restricted by supply factors since production can be shifted from non-durables
towards durables. Indeed, non-durable purchases by the young decline on impact, driving
the decline in aggregate non-durable purchases.
Several quarters after the shock, the response of non-durable purchases by the young
turns from negative to positive. This sign switch is important to understand the bust in
output that follows several periods after the shock. To see this, note that under the assumed
preferences, the young agents labor supply equation directly links output and the non-
durable consumption of the young, as it can be written as:
1
cyt
=
yt

:
Thus, under these preferences output and non-durable purchases necessarily co-move nega-
tively. Intuitively, leisure is a normal good and the urge to buy durables makes young agents
willing to forego leisure and non-durable consumption in the initial periods of the expan-
sion. While remaining young, however, the young agents increasingly reap the benets from
the redistributional e¤ects of the monetary policy, which increases their lifetime wealth and
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thus their demand for leisure and non-durables. The latter "pure wealth e¤ect" starts to
dominate several quarters after the initial shock and the non-durables response turns from
negative to positive. The above discussion makes clear that this e¤ect is also behind the
boom-bust response of aggregate output.
4.3 Helicopter drops
We now contrast the e¤ects of open market operations to the e¤ects of shocks in an alternative
economy in which monetary policy is implemented using "helicopter drops" of money. By
a helicopter drop we mean an expansion in the money supply that is not accompanied by
an increase in central bank bond holdings, but rather an outright transfer to the treasury.23
It then follows that the total transfer from the treasury to the households is given by its
interest earnings on bond holdings (which can be negative) plus the change in the money
supply. In real terms, the transfer to the households becomes:
rt 1 jb
g
t j 1
1 + t j
+mt j   mt j 1
1 + t j
= o
n
t +  (1  o) yt + (1  ) ot (26)
where j is again a delay in transferring government income to households. We assume
again that helicopter drops are gradually reversed after the initial shock, following the same
feedback rule as used for in the economy with market operations.24
Figures 4 and 5 plot the responses for the economy with helicopter drops, together with
those for our benchmark economy with open market operations. These gures show that
although responses of prices and real money balances to helicopter drops are comparable to
those in our benchmark economy with open market operations, the e¤ects on real economic
outcomes are drastically di¤erent. In particular, with helicopter drops output and durable
expenditures decline following an expansion of the money supply, whereas the real interest
rate increases several periods after the shock. Thus, the transmission of monetary policy
depends importantly on the operating procedures of the central bank.
<<Figure 4 here>>
23Consequently, bcbt remains zero at all times.
24For comparability, we do not re-scale the magnitude of the shock relative to the benchmark model.
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<<Figure 5 here>>
The responses plotted in Figure 5 reveal why the e¤ects of a monetary expansion are
so di¤erent in the two economies. First of all, the response of the government transfer to
households is very di¤erent when helicopter drops are used. Rather than a persistent increase
in these transfers, there is a large increase after one year with a magnitude of about 2 percent
of annual GDP. In later periods, there is a persistent decline in government transfers, relative
to the steady state. Thus, in the economy with open market operations a monetary expansion
is relatively favorable for those households in their working life long after the initial shock,
which includes generations yet unborn in the initial period of the shock. The impact of a
helicopter drop, by contrast, is more similar to a one-time redistribution between retired
agents and agents in their working life. Hence the pure wealth e¤ect dominates immediately
following the initial helicopter drop and young households increase both leisure and non-
durable consumption, as well as durables. As all three utility components are increased
simultaneously, however, the response of durables is weaker than in the economy with OMO.
Hence, the increase in durable purchases by the young is insu¢ cient to o¤set the decline in
durable purchases by the old, resulting in a decline in aggregate durable purchases.
4.4 The role of risk aversion
Although the most of the responses implied by our benchmark model are in line with the
VAR evidence, the model predicts a decline in non-durables whereas the VAR predicts a
very small but nonetheless positive response. Also, the increase in output in our benchmark
model is relatively short-lived. Since our model is rather stylized we do not attempt to
estimate its parameters. Instead we explore whether a plausible reparameterization of the
model can be helpful to bringing the model closer to the VAR.
Figure 6 plots the response to a monetary expansion implemented using OMOs, compar-
ing the benchmark model to a version in which the coe¢ cient of risk aversion, , is lowered
from 1 to 0.6.25 The gure shows that under this parameterization, the output increase
becomes more persistent. Whereas in the benchmark the output turns negative after about
25We also recalibrate to match the steady-state targets described in the previous subsection.
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one and a half year, this is increase to 2.5 years under lower risk aversion, close to moment
of the sign switch in the empirical response. Also, the model now predicts a joint increase
in non-durables, durables and output following a monetary expansion. This is a result that
is di¢ cult to obtain in sticky-price models, see Barsky, House and Kimball (2007). The
response of durables is markedly smaller under the alternative parameterization, but still
much larger than the response of non-durable consumption.
<<Figure 6 here>>
5 Concluding remarks
We study the e¤ects of open market operations in a real general equilibrium model with a
parsimonious life cycle structure. We show that monetary expansions stemming from OMO
generate negative wealth e¤ects in the population, with a more negative impact on old agents
whose income stems from nancial assets. Working agents respond to higher ination by
working and saving more and by accumulating durable goods. This causes a boom in output
driven by the durable good sector, consistent with the empirical evidence.
The distributional e¤ects embedded in our model are consistent with empirical evidence
on the e¤ects of monetary interventions in the US economy. They point to a di¤erent
transmission mechanism of monetary policy that can complement the standard NK channel
based on nominal rigidities. In a model extension, we allow for search and matching frictions.
In this setting, the increase in employment results from higher labour demand, rather than
a voluntary increase in labour supply as in the baseline case.
References
References
[1] Algan, Yann, Allais, Olivier, Challe, Edouard, and Xavier Ragot (2012), Monetary
Shocks under Incomplete Markets,mimeo.
28
[2] Andolfatto, David (1996), Business Cycles and Labor-Market Search,American Eco-
nomic Review, 86(1), 112-32.
[3] Ascari, Guido and N. Rankin (2007), Perpetual Youth and Endogenous Labor Supply:
A Problem and a Possible Solution,Journal of Macroeconomics, 29, 708-723
[4] Barro, Robert J. (1974), Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, Journal of Political
Economy, 82(6), 1095-1117.
[5] Barsky, R.B., House, C.L., Kimball, M.S. (2003), Do Flexible Durable Goods Prices
Undermine Sticky Price Models?National Bureau of Economic Research Working Pa-
per 9832.
[6] Barsky, R.B., House, C.L., Kimball, M.S. (2007), Sticky-price Models and Durable
Goods,American Economic Review, 97(3), 984998.
[7] Baxter, Marianne (1996), Are Consumer Durables Important for Business Cycles?,
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78(1), 147-55.
[8] Bernanke, Ben and Alan Blinder (1992), The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of
Monetary Transmission,American Economic Review, 82(4), 901-921.
[9] Bernanke, B.S.,Gertler, M.L. (1995), Inside the Black Box: the Credit Channel of
Monetary Policy Transmission,Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 2748.
[10] Bernanke, Ben and Ilian Mihov (1998), Measuring Monetary Policy,Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 113, 315-334.
[11] Bils, Mark and Peter Klenow (2004), Some evidence on the Importance of Sticky
Prices,Journal of Political Economy, 112, 947985.
[12] Boivin, Jean and Marc Giannoni (2006), Has Monetary Policy Become More E¤ec-
tive?Review of Economics and Statistics, 88, 433-444.
[13] Calvo, Guillermo (1983), Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework,Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, 12, 383-398.
29
[14] Card, D. (1990), Unexpected Ination, Real Wages, and Employment Determination
in Union Contracts,American Economic Review, 80, 669688.
[15] Cass, David, Masahiro Okuno and Itzhak Zilcha (1979), The Role of Money in Sup-
porting the Pareto Optimality of Competitive Equilibrium in Consumption-Loan Type
Models,Journal of Economic Theory, 20, 41-80.
[16] Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum and Charles Evans (1999), Monetary Policy
Shocks: What Have We Learn and to What End?, in John B. Taylor and Michael
Woodford, (eds), Handbook of Macroeconomics. Volume 1A, 65-148, Elsevier Science,
North-Holland.
[17] Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum and Charles Evans (2005), Nominal Rigidi-
ties and the Dynamic E¤ects of a Shock to Monetary Policy,Journal of Polical Econ-
omy, 113, 1-45.
[18] Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y., Kueng, L., Silvia, J. (2012), Innocent Bystanders?
Monetary Policy and Inequality in the U.S.,Berkeley manuscript.
[19] Danthine, Jean-Pierre, John Donaldson and Lance Smith (1987), On the Superneu-
trality of Money in a Stochastic Dynamic Macroeconomic Model,Journal of Monetary
Economics, 20, 475-499.
[20] Diamond, Peter (1965), National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model,American
Economic Review, 55, 1126-1150.
[21] Doepke, M., Schneider, M. (2006), Ination and the Redistribution of Nominal
Wealth,Journal of Political Economy 114 (6), 1069-1097.
[22] Dotsey, Michael, Robert King and Alexander Wolman (1999), State-Dependent Pricing
and the General Equilibrium Dynamics of Money and Output,Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 114, 655-90.
[23] Fischer, Stanley (1979), Capital Accumulation on the Transition Path in a Monetary
Optimizing Model,Econometrica, 47, 1433-1439.
30
[24] Fuhrer, Je¤rey (2000), Habit Formation in Consumption and Its Implications for Mon-
etary Policy,American Economic Review, 90, 367-390.
[25] Gertler, Mark (1999), Government Debt and Social Security in a Life-Cycle Economy,
Carnegie-Rochester Conference on Public Policy, 50, 61-110.
[26] Gornemann, Nils, Kuester, Keith, and Makoto Nakajima (2012), Monetary Policy with
Heterogeneous Agents(2012), Philadelphia Fed Working Paper 12-21.
[27] Iacoviello, Matteo (2005), House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy
in the Business Cycle.American Economic Review 95, 739764.
[28] Ireland, Peter M. (2005), The Liquidity Trap, The Real Balance E¤ect, and the Fried-
man Rule, International Economic Review, 46(4), 1271-1301.
[29] Rotemberg, J., (1982), Sticky prices in the United States. Journal of Political Economy
90, 1187-1211.
[30] Rotemberg, Julio and Michael Woodford (1997), An Optimization-Based Econometric
Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy,NBER Macroeconomics Annual,
297-346.
[31] Schabert, Andreas (2004), Interactions of Monetary and Fiscal Policy via Open Market
Operations, The Economic Journal, 114, 2004, C186-C206
[32] Sidrauski, Miguel (1967), Rational Choice and Patterns of Growth in a Monetary
Economy,American Economic Review 57, 534-544.
[33] Sims, Christopher and Tao Zha (1999), Error Bands for Impulse Responses,Econo-
metrica, 67, 1113-55.
[34] Wallace, Neil (1981), A Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Open Market Operations,
American Economic Review, 71, 267274.
[35] Weil, Philippe (1991), Is Money Net Wealth?, International Economic Review, 32,
37-53.
31
[36] Woodford, Michael (2003), Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary
Policy,Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[37] Woodford, Michael (2012), Methods of Policy Accommodation at the Interest-Rate
Lower Bound,Jackson Hole symposium paper.
32
Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Impulse response function of headline variables to monetary policy shocks using VAR
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Figure 2: Model responses to expansionary OMO.
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Figure 3: Model responses to expansionary OMO.
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Figure 4: Model responses to expansionary OMO versus helicopter drop.
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Figure 5: Model responses to expansionary OMO versus helicopter drop.
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Figure 6: Model responses to expansionary OMO; benchmark versus lower risk aversion
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Table 1. Parameter values.
value description motivation
 0:9732 subjective discount factor target 4% s.s. annual interest rate
 0:31 durable preference param. target 20% s.s. spending on durables (NIPA)
 0:0068 money preference param. target 1.8 s.s. M2 velocity ( y
m
) (FRB/NIPA)
 1 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion convention macro literature
 1 intratemporal elast. of substitution convention macro literature
 1 inv. elasticity labor supply convention macro literature
 0:5795 disutility of labor normalize aggregate quarterly output to one
o 0:0063 ageing probability average duration working life 40 years
x 0:0125 death probability average duration retirement 20 years
 0:04 depreciation rate durables Baxter (1996)
bg0  2:4 initial bond holdings treasury government debt 60% of annual output
bcb0 0 initial bond holdings central bank no initial central bank debt
 0:15 coe¢ cient monetary rule half life response nominal interest rate 2.5 years
j 4 transfer delay treasury one year delay
Appendix
In this Appendix we present additional evidence supplementing the empirical results, provide
full derivation of the results and study extensions of the model that allow for search and
matching frictions in the labour market as well as wage rigidity.
A1. Alternative Estimation Approach
Figure A1 shows the empirical response of the same macroeconomic variables as in Figure
1 when the identication of shocks relies on Romer and Romer (2004). As illustrated in the
Figure, the results are qualitatively similar to those obtained from a recursive VAR, and
remarkably close also from a quantitative point of view.
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Figure A2 shows the empirical response of the macroeconomic variables using the recur-
sive VAR identication as in Figure 1, but including personal income and social security
taxes in the system. Figure A3 shows the same plots using the Romer and Romer identica-
tion. The responses of all variables is similar to those resulting from the baseline estimations
without taxes. Interestingly, however taxes decrease following the monetary expansion. This
is consistent with our model: with a monetary expansion, the bond holdings by the Central
Bank increase, which leads to higher transfers from the Central Bank to the Treasury. This,
in turn, leads to lower taxes (higher transfers) to individuals. The e¤ect on taxes is quite
persistent.
Figure A1: Impulse response function of headline variables to
monetary policy shock Romer&Romer
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Figure A2: Impulse response function of headline variables to
monetary policy shock VAR approach
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Figure A3: Impulse response function of headline variables to
monetary policy shock Romer&Romer adding scal variables
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A2. Model derivations
A2.1 The governments budget constraint
The consolidated government budget constraint in real terms can be written as:
bgt + b
cb
t  mt =
1 + rt 1
1 + t
 
bgt 1 + b
cb
t 1
 mt 1   gt
where g  ont +  (1  o) yt + (1  ) ot is the total transfer to the households. Dene:
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$t+1  1 + rt
1 + t+1
 
bgt + b
cb
t
 mt;
=
1 + rt
1 + t+1

1 + rt 1
1 + t
 
bgt 1 + b
cb
t 1
 mt 1   gt + rt1 + rtmt

;
=
1 + rt
1 + t+1

$t   gt +
rt
1 + rt
mt

:
Also, dene Ds as in the main text note that 1+rs1+s+1Ds+1 = Ds. Consider budget constraint
for period s and multiply both sides by Ds+1:
Ds+1$s+1 = Ds

$s   gs +
rs
1 + rs
ms

:
Sum all constraints from period t to innity:
1P
s=t
Ds+1$s+1 =
1P
s=t
Ds

$s   gs +
rs
1 + rs
ms

;
where we impose the limit condition
1P
s!1
Ds$s = 0. Finally, rearrange to obtain:
1P
s=t
Ds

rs 1
1 + rs 1
ms   gs

= mt   (1 + rt)
 
bgt + b
cb
t

A2.2 Solving the model
The model is solved using rst-order perturbation (linearization). This part of the Appendix
describes the rst-order conditions for the optimization problems of the individuals and
discusses aggregation of the individualschoices.
Old agents and aggregation. Although the model features a representative young agent,
there is wealth heterogeneity among the old agents. Typically, dynamic models with a large
number of heterogeneous agents are challenging to solve. For our model, however, it turns out
that policy functions are linear in wealth, which implies that aggregation is straightforward.
Hence we can solve for aggregates without reference to the distribution of wealth among old
agents. Wealth heterogeneity between young and old agents, however, is a key factor driving
aggregate dynamics.
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We exploit that the use of rst-order perturbation implies certainty equivalence (see
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004)). As a consequence, rst-order approximations to the
equilibrium laws of motion of the model coincide with those obtained for a version without
aggregate uncertainty.26 In what follows, we therefore omit expectations operators.27
The rst-order conditions for the choices of durables, money and bonds by an old house-
hold i can be written, respectively, as:
Uc;i;t = Ud;i;t +  (1  x) (1  )Uc;i;t+1;
Uc;i;t = Um;i;t +
 (1  x)
(1 + t+1)
Uc;i;t+1;
Uc;i;t =
 (1  x) (1 + rt)
(1 + t+1)
Uc;i;t+1:
Now introduce four auxiliary variables c;i;t  ci;tai;t ; d;i;t 
di;t
ai;t
; m;i;t  mi;tai;t and b;i;t 
bi;t
ai;t
:The crucial step is to show that there are four restrictions that pin down c;i;t, d;i;t,
m;i;t and b;i;t as functions of only aggregate variables. To nd these coe¢ cients, rst
combine the rst-order conditions to obtain:
Uc;i;t = Ud;i;t + (1  ) (1 + t+1) (Uc;i;t   Um;i;t)
Uc;i;t = (1 + rt) (Uc;i;t   Um;i;t)
Under the assumed nested CES preferences we obtain:
Uc;i;t = x
 
i;t

  1
h
c
 1

i;t + d
 1

i;t + m
 1

i;t
i 
 1 1   1

c
 1

 1
i;t ;
= x
 +1

i;t c
 1

i;t ;
Ud;i;t = x
 +1

i;t d
 1

i;t ;
Um;i;t = x
 +1

i;t m
 1

i;t :
26Both versions preserve idiosyncratic uncertainty.
27Alternatively, one could rst linearize the model equations and then perform the steps described below.
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The combined rst-order conditions become:

 1

c;i;t = 
 1

d;i;t + (1  ) (1 + t+1)


 1

c;i;t   
 1

m;i;t

(27)

 1

c;i;t = (1 + rt)


 1

c;i;t   
 1

m;i;t

(28)
To get the third restriction, consider the Euler equation for bonds, which can be written as:

xi;t
xi;t+1
 +1


ci;t
ci;t+1
 1

=
 (1  x) (1 + rt)
(1 + t+1)
(29)
and use the fact that ai;t+1 =

(1  ) d;i;t + m;i;t1+t+1 +
(1+rt)b;i;t
1+t+1

ai;t to write:
ci;t
ci;t+1
=
c;i;t
c;i;t+1

(1  ) d;i;t + m;i;t1+t+1 +
(1+rt)b;i;t
1+t+1

xi;t
xi;t+1
=
240@   1c;i;t +   1d;i;t +   1m;i;t

 1

c;i;t+1 + 
 1

d;i;t+1 + 
 1

m;i;t+1
1A35  1 1
(1  ) d;i;t + m;i;t1+t+1 +
(1+rt)b;i;t
1+t+1
The budget constraint gives the fourth restriction since it can be written as:
c;i;tai;t + d;i;tai;t + m;i;tai;t + b;i;tai;t = ai;t
or:
c;i;t + d;i;t + m;i;t + b;i;t = 1 (30)
Equations (1)-(4) pin down c;i;t; d;i;t; m;i;t and b;i;t as functions of only aggregate variables,
as we have substituted out individual wealth from all the equations. Hence we can omit
individual i-subscripts for these variables. Given the average wealth level among old agents,
aot , we can now compute averages for the old agents decision variables as c
o
t = c;ta
o
t ;
dot = d;ta
o
t ; m
o
t = m;ta
o
t and b
o
t = b;ta
o
t . Note that these objects do not depend on the
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distribution of wealth among old agents. Finally, note that aot satises:
aot = (1  x)

(1  ) dot 1 +
mot 1 + (1 + rt 1)b
o
t 1
1 + t

+o (1  x)

1  

(1  ) dyt 1 +
myt 1 + (1 + rt 1)b
y
t 1
1 + t

:
Young agents. As discussed in the main text there is e¤ectively a representative young
agent. Its rst-order conditions for the choices of durables, money and bonds can be written
as:
Uyc;t = h

t
Uyc;t = U
y
d;t +  (1  o) (1  )Uyc;t+1 + o (1  x) (1  )Uyoc;t+1;
Uyc;t = U
y
m;t + 

1  o
1 + t+1

Uyc;t+1 + 
o (1  x)
1 + t+1
Uyoc;t+1;
Uyc;t
(1 + rt)
= 
1  o
1 + t+1
Uyc;t+1 + 
o (1  x)
1 + t+1
Uyoc;t+1:
Here, Uyc;t and U
yo
c;t are the marginal utility of non-durables of the young and newly retired
agents, respectively, which satisfy:
Uyc;t = (x
y
t )
 +1
 (cyt )
 1

Uyd;t = (x
y
t )
 +1
  (dyt )
 1

Uym;t = (x
y
t )
 +1
  (myt )
 1

Uyoc;t = (x
yo
t )
 +1
 (cyot )
 1

where xyot =
h
(cyot )
 1
 +  (dyot )
 1
 +  (myot )
 1

i 
 1
, cyot = c;ta
y
t , d
yo
t = d;ta
y
t and m
yo
t =
m;ta
y
t . Finally, the wealth of a young agent can be expressed as:
ayt = (1  o + ox)

(1  ) dyt 1 +
myt 1 + (1 + rt 1)b
y
t 1
1 + t

+
1  

x

(1  ) dot 1 +
mot 1 + (1 + rt 1)b
o
t 1
1 + t

:
Below we describe two special cases.
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The full system. Old agents:

 1

c;t = 
 1

d;t + (1  ) (1 + t+1)


 1

c;t   
 1

m;t

(31)

 1

c;t = (1 + rt)


 1

c;t   
 1

m;t

(32)
 (1  x) (1 + rt)
(1 + t+1)
= (t)
 +1


c;t+1
c;t

(1  ) d;t +
m;t
1 + t+1
+
(1 + rt) b;t
1 + t+1
 1

(33)
t =
240@   1c;t +   1d;t +   1m;t

 1

c;t+1 + 
 1

d;i;t+1 + 
 1

m;t+1
1A35  1 1
(1  ) d;t + m;t1+t+1 +
(1+rt)b;t
1+t+1
(34)
cot = c;ta
o
t (35)
dot = d;ta
o
t (36)
mot = m;ta
o
t (37)
bot = b;ta
o
t (38)
aot = (1  x)

(1  ) dot 1 +
mot 1 + (1 + rt 1)b
o
t 1
1 + t

(39)
+o (1  x)

1  

(1  ) dyt 1 +
myt 1 + (1 + rt 1)b
y
t 1
1 + t

(40)
aot = c
o
t + d
o
t +m
o
t + b
o
t (41)
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Young / newly retired agents:
(xyt )
 +1
 (cyt )
 1
 = ht (42)
(cyt )
 1
 =  (dyt )
 1
 +  (1  o) (1  )

xyt+1
xyt
 +1
  
cyt+1
 1
 (43)
+o (1  x) (1  )

xyot+1
xyt
 +1
  
cyot+1
 1
 ;
(cyt )
 1
 =  (myt )
 1
 + 

1  o
1 + t+1

xyt+1
xyt
 +1
  
cyt+1
 1
 (44)
+
o (1  x)
1 + t+1

xyot+1
xyt
 +1
  
cyot+1
 1
 ;
(cyt )
 1
 = 
(1  o) (1 + rt)
1 + t+1

xyt+1
xyt
 +1
  
cyt+1
 1
 (45)
+
o (1  x) (1 + rt)
1 + t+1

xyot+1
xyt
 +1
  
cyot+1
 1
 :
ayt = (1  o + ox)

(1  ) dyt 1 +
myt 1 + (1 + rt 1)b
y
t 1
1 + t

(46)
+
1  

x

(1  ) dot 1 +
mot 1 + (1 + rt 1)b
o
t 1
1 + t

cyt + d
y
t +m
y
t + b
y
t = a
y
t + h
y
t + 
s
t (47)
cyot = c;ta
y
t (48)
xyot =
h 
c;ta
y
t
  1
 + 
 
d;ta
y
t
  1
 + 
 
m;ta
y
t
  1

i 
 1
(49)
xyt =
h
(cyt ) +  (d
y
t )
 1
 +  (myt )
 1

i 
 1
(50)
Government policy:
rt 1
 
bgt 1 + b
cb
t 1

1 + t
=  (1  o)  st (51)
mt
mt 1
(1 + t) = 1 + zt (52)
zt =  (m mt 1) + "t (53)
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Market clearing:
ct + dt = h
y
t + (1  ) dt 1 (54)
ct = c
y
t + (1  ) cot (55)
dt = d
y
t + (1  ) dot (56)
mt = m
y
t + (1  )mot (57)
0 = bgt + b
cb
t + b
y
t + (1  ) bot (58)
These are 28 equations in 28 variables, being ct, cot , c
yo
t , c
y
t , dt, d
o
t , d
y
t , mt, m
o
t , m
y
t , b
o
t ,
byt , b
g
t , b
cb
t , x
y
t , x
yo
t ,t; c;t, d;t, m;t, b;t, h
y
t , rt, t, 
s
t , zt; a
o
t , and a
yo
t . We leave out the
governments budget constraint, which is redundant by Walraslaw.
Special cases Special case 1 ( = 1):When the utility elasticity  equals one, the utility
function becomes a Cobb-Douglas basket nested in a CRRA function:
U(ci;t; di;t;mi;t) =
 
ci;td

i;tm

i;t
1    1
1  
and the marginal utilities become Uc;i;t =
x1 i;t
ci;t
Ud;i;t = 
x1 i;t
di;t
and Um;i;t = 
x1 i;t
mi;t
: In the
system to be solved, we correspondingly set:
xyt = (c
y
t ) (d
y
t )

(myt )

xyot = (c
yo
t ) (d
yo
t )

(myot )

t =

c;t
c;t+1

d;t
d;t+1
  m;t
m;t+1

(1  ) d;t +
m;t
1 + t+1
+
(1 + rt) b;t
1 + t+1
 (1++)
Special case 2 ( =  = 1): When both the risk aversion coe¢ cient  and the utility
elasticity  are unity, the utility function further simplies to:
U(ci;t; di;t;mi;t) = ln ci;t +  ln di;t +  lnmi;t
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and the marginal utilities become Uc;i;t = 1ci;t , Ud;i;t =

di;t
and Um;i;t =

mi;t
. In the program
we therefore set (xyt )
 +1
 = (xyot )
 +1
 = (t)
 +1
 = 1.
A2.3 Extensions of the Model: Unemployment and wage rigidities
In this section we introduce frictions in the labor market to the model. In particular, we
model a simple search and matching friction between workers and rms following the ap-
proach of Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides.
Young agents can be either unemployed or matched with a rm.28 A worker-rm pair
produces one unit of output. A separation between a worker and a rm takes place if
the worker retires. If the worker does not retire, the match dissolves with an exogenous
probability s. The overall separation rate, denoted es, is therefore given by es = o+(1  o)
s: Newborn agents enter the workforce as unemployed. It follows that the number of job
searchers in the economy, which we denote st, is given by st = o + (1  o) snt 1.
Following Andolfatto (1996) and many others, we assume that there is full income in-
surance among workers. Hence, we preserve our setup without heterogeneity among young
agents. Matching in the labor market takes place at the beginning of the period, after aggre-
gate and individual shocks have realized, but before production takes place. The evolution
of the employment rate among young agents, denoted nt, is given by:
nt = (1  es)nt 1 + gt;
where gt denotes the number of new hires in period t.
The asset value of a rm matched with a worker is given by:
Vt = 1  wt + (1  es) t;t+1Vt+1;
where t;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor of the owner of the rm. For simplicity we
assume that only young agents are able to run rms.29,30 Unmatched rms are enabled to
28We set  = 0 in this model version, i.e. there is no disutility from work.
29Thus, upon retirement agents are forced to sell o¤ the ownership of the rm to a young agent.
30It follows that Ett;t+1Vt+1 =  (1  o)Et
Uyc;t+1
Uyc;t
Vt+1 + o (1  x)Et
Uyoc;t+1
Uyc;t
Vt+1
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search on the labor market after paying a vacancy cost . There is free entry of rms, which
implies that
 = tVt;
where t  gtvt is the probability of nding a worker, where vt is the total number of vacancies
posted in the economy. Given a number of vacancies and a number of searchers, the total
number of new matches follows from an aggregate matching function given by:
gt = s

t v
1 
t :
We assume the real wage is xed, i.e. wt = w, which is consistent with equilibrium.31
Hence we treat w as a parameter which we use to target a steady-state unemployment rate
of seven percent. The matching function elasticity, , is set to 0.5. The separation rate s
is chosen to imply es = 0:1; i.e. an overall separation rate of ten percent per quarter. The
vacancy cost, , is calibrated to imply that the expected steady-state cost of hiring a worker
is ve percent of quarterly output. Finally, the monetary feedback parameter  is set to 0.35.
The blue line in Figure 7 plots the responses to a monetary expansion implemented
using OMOs. Like in the model with a Walrasian market, durables increase on impact,
whereas non-durables decline somewhat. Output declines marginally initially, but quickly
rises above its steady state level, showing a much more persistent increase than in the model
with a Walrasian labor market. Underlying is an e¤ect that is not present in the model with
a Walrasian labor market: with matching frictions, rm investment serves as an additional
way of saving. Hence, the increased desire to save following the monetary expansion is not
only reected in a surge in durable purchases, but also in an increase in rm investment,
leading to a persistent increase in vacancy posting. The latter in turn results in a gradual
increase in output.
Figure 7 also plots the responses to a monetary shock implemented using helicopter drops.
Output and durables increase, but less than in the economy with OMOs. Also, the decline in
the real interest rate is substantially smaller. Thus, the implementation of monetary policy
31One can verify the real wage is always inside the bargaining set in our simulations.
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continues to a¤ect real outcomes when the labor market is subject to search and matching
frictions.
Figure 7: Model responses to expansionary OMO versus helicopter drop.
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